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Abstract 
The wide development of interconnectivity of cellular networks with 
the internet network has made them to be vulnerable. This exposure 
of the cellular networks to internet has increased threats to customer 
end equipment as well as the carrier infrastructure. If is very difficult 
to deal with the full fledged infrastructure in a typical service 
provider network due to operational constraints.However still it’s 
very important for an analysis to evaluate the vulnerabilities and take 
connective action. This paper introduces the modeling of a small 
cellular network with security weakness (2G, 2.5G, 3G).This is done 
by using of the shelf hardware components to set up an experimental 
test bed. The vulnerability of such cellular networks is attempted with 
the construction of a ghost GSM tower through shelf hardware 
components. This paper also discusses concepts of test bed GSM 
security and possibility of conducting man-in-the-middle attack on 
the cellular networks model. 
 
INDEX TERMS-- Cellular network vulnerability, GSM (global 
system for mobile communication), MITM (man-in-the-middle 
attack) 
     
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays attackers use GSM prototype towers to simulate 
attacks and breaking into 2G/2.5/3G networks. Most of the 
subsystems used are not easy to procure as they are not widely 
accessible to general public. Almost all of them are owned or 
regulated by law enforcement agencies. Several hackers also 
have successfully executed (man-in-the -middle)MITM 
attacks on cellular networks (including 2G/2.5/3G networks) 
in the real world. GSM was never designed to be resistant to 
SIM cloning and eavesdropping but just to serve as a 
minimallysecure communication medium. GSM uses 
integrated crypto graphical mechanisms[1]. Previously 
cryptography had been the domain of military, security 
agencies, and also banks. Security design of GSM 
communication aims to provide Authentication, 
Confidentiality and Anonymity. Authentication is 
concentrated to ensure that the network operator can 
verify the identity of the subscriber. In order to do so, it 
has to be infeasible to clone someone else’s mobile 
phone or SIM card. Authentication is ensured through 
challenge-response protocol. Confidentiality protects data, 
voice and sensitive signaling information against 
eavesdropping on radio path which is done by using 
symmetric key algorithm to encrypt the radio channel. 
Anonymity protects against someone who tracks the location 
of the user or identifies calls either made to or received by 
eavesdropping on radio path. Rest of this paper is organized as 
follows: Section II consists of a background and provides 
technical details of GSM, MITM attacks on cellular networks, 
and encryption algorithms used at network layers of a GSM 
network and SDR.Section III is about designing software and 
implementation. Finally conclusion is represented in 
thesection IV. 
 
 
II. REVIEW OF ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS 
2. GSM 
Global system for mobile communication (GSM) may be 
a globally accepted normal for digital cellular communication. 
GSM is that the name of a normalization cluster established in 
1982 with the aim of creation of a standard european 
telecommunications standard that will formulate specifications 
for a pan-European mobile cellular radio system operative at 
900 MHZ. 
 
 
2.1 GSM Architecture  
GSM system consists of several sub systems which interact 
with one another to provide mobile communication service 
after verification customer credentials. In this sub section, we 
quickly clarify about some of these subsystems. The three 
major components of GSM system include: MS (Mobile 
Station), BSS (Base Station Subsystem), and NSS (Network 
Switching Subsystem). [2] 
Mobile Station (MS): It includes the following two 
components: 1) Mobile Equipment (ME), 2) Mobile 
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). Mobile station allows the 
separation of user mobility from equipment mobility, as well.  
Base Transceiver Station (BTS): BTS is a piece of 
equipment that facilitates wireless communication between 
user equipment and the Telco network. Each cell of mobile 
network operator has one BTS consisting of high speed 
directional transmitter and receiver.  
Base Station Controller (BSC):BSC provides all 
the management functions and physical links 
between MSC and BTS. it's a high-capacity switch providing 
some functions like relinquishing, cell configuration data, 
and management of frequence (RF) power levels at base 
transceiver stations. A bunch of BSCs area unit served 
by associate degree MSC. 
Mobile Switching Centre (MSC): MSC performs 
the telephone change functions of the system. It controls calls 
to and from  data systems and different phone. 
It additionally  mobility of subscribers and switches node of a 
PLMN (Public Land Mobile Network), allocation of Radio 
Resource (RR), There may be many MSCs in a PLMN. 
Visitor Location Registers (VLR): Contains temporary 
information about mobile subscribers that are currently located 
in MSC service area however whose HLR are elsewhere VLR 
is answerable for a group of  location areas, classically 
associated with an MSC.  
Home Location Register (HLR): HLR Contains semi-
permanent subscriber information. For all users registered to 
network, HLR saves users’ profiles. MSCs exchange 
information by HLR .When MS registers into a new GMSC, 
then HLR sends user’s profile to new MSC. 
2.2 Man in the middle attack (MITM): A MITM attack is a 
type of attack by eavesdropping on a user’s communication 
with other user(s).This communication is monitored and 
modified by an unauthorized party. The hacker eavesdrops 
consistently through interception of a public key message 
exchange and on the other hand retransmission of message by 
replacing the requested key by his own.  
In these attacks, hackers are primarily targeting specific data 
about the transactions on computers. This can be anything 
from an email to a bank transaction that said the hackers begin 
their investigation of the party of interest. The Universal 
Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) is one of the 
third generation mobile technologies which are used in most 
parts of the globe as promotion to existing GSM mobile 
networks [3].  
UMTS subscribers who roam in GSM network are obviously 
unprotected and unguarded during GSM authentication against 
false Base Station attacks. Previously, it was widely 
recognized in available documents of the 3GPP 
standardization organization [4] that was concentrating on 
prevention from “false Base Station attacks” for UMTS 
subscribers roaming in GSM. In fact it recommended 
modifying the integrity of protection mechanism. [5]. 
Moreover, the attack described is far beyond of those attacks 
foreseen by 3GPP in UMTS subscribers. They are even 
defenseless and exposed to what 3GPP calls a “false Base 
Station attack”, even though subscribers are roaming in a pure 
UMTS network, and UMTS authentication is used. This attack 
would be divided into the category as a “roll-back attack”. 
Therefore these attacks utilize and make use of old versions of 
algorithms and protocols weakness through the use of 
mechanisms defined to ensure backward similarity and 
compatibility of newer and stronger versions. Previous results 
of roll-back attacks consisted of SSL Protocol [6] and 
encryption mechanisms in GSM. 
 
III. IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 3. GSM Block Diagram: Here we show that model and 
briefly explain methodology.The diagram shows how a cell 
phone can connect to internet, laptop or telephone. 
 
 
Fig. 3.1: GSM Block Diagram 
In fact this is an attempt to provide an open-source Unix 
application. Generally it uses the Universal Software Radio 
Peripheral (USRP) to GSM air to cross point and interface the 
standard GSM handsets. It also applies the Asterisk software 
PBX to provide connection to calls. It uses the USRP 
hardware to receive and transmit the signaling that takes place 
by the usage of GNU Radio framework [6]. The main task of 
the Asterisk is to interact or interface GSM calls between 
cellular phones. The GNU Radio is, in fact, a free software 
development toolkit. The GUN provides signal processing 
runtime and also processing blocks to implement a software 
radio which uses readily-available external RF hardware 
(USRP).Designing USRP (Universal Software Radio 
Peripheral) is by Ettus Research. It generally serves as a 
digital baseband and IF section of a radio communication 
system. It is hardware allowing general purpose computers to 
function as high bandwidth software radios. A few daughter 
boards can be possible to apply with the USRP covering from 
DC to 5.9 GHz. According to the current condition, we might 
be able to develop and utilize the RFX900 to cover the GSM 
850 and 900 bands, or the RFX1800 to cover the GSM 1800 
and 1900 bands [7]. 
3.1 USRP N210: Universal Software Radio Peripheral rapidly 
designs powerful, flexible software radio platforms. In this 
case we use USRP N210 with three important parts, including 
Transmit Channel, Receiver Channel and GPS DO (Discipline 
Oscillator).Transmit Channel and Receive Channel are often 
used to send and receive data or voice. GPS DO is the 
combination of GPS receiver and high quality. [8]  
3.2 GNU Radio: GNU is recursive acronym for GNU’s Not 
Unix. GNU Radio is a platform for experimenting digital 
communication and also is a software radio construction. 
GNU Radio is an open source tool. Actually the software is 
free (Python and C++ Source Code/ Linux Environment). 
Usually for most of the cases, there is no need for expensive 
RF test machine. 
3.3 GSM Authentication Process (2G/2.5G) Diagram: 
 
 
Fig. 3.8: GSM Authentication Diagram 
 
 
Authentication is based on the SIM (Subscriber Identity 
Module) which stores individual authentication based key Ki, 
the user identification International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
(IMSI), and the algorithm used for authentication A3. The user 
of specific key Ki is provided by the Telco operator at the time 
of customer registration. 
1. MS sends request to GSM operator, mobile phone also 
sends its IMSI in a plain text.  
2. GSM operator replies with the challenge RAND. Access 
Control (AC) generates a random number RAND as challenge.  
3. MS responds with SRES. SRES is computed as A3ki 
(RAND) and through RAND Network [VLR] compares 
results. The operator calculates SRES and compares it with the 
SRES received from the MS. If they match Kc as shown in the 
next step.  
4. MS and operator calculate Kc=A8 Ki (SRES).   
5. Kc is appended by Fn which serves as salt (random data).   
6. The encryption of user messages m is done by using A5 
algorithm and (Kc||Fn) as the key.   
MITM attack can be executed by a ghost Base Station. The 
ghost Base Station can stand between MS and GSM 
Operation. Then it can play the role of BS for MS and for 
GSM Operation as MS. Afterwards it can request BS to turn 
off encryption and use A5/0. In addition to MITM, the ghost 
Base Station can also impersonate a genuine MS.  
3.4 Mobile Phone Captured for GSM-900 and GSM-1800 
Base Stations: First of all we need to find out the frequency 
of channel and play roles as BS. In this case we have four 
parts: TMSI, IMSI, AGE and used. TMSI is Temporary 
Mobile Subscriber Identity. It is the identity that is commonly 
sent between network and cell phone .TMSI is assigned via 
the VLR, anywhere and to any mobile. IMSI is International 
Mobile Subscriber Identity that has a particular and unique 
number to each mobile. Actually AGE and used explained the 
first time mobile connection to device and also the last time 
use of mobile to make a call or send a message. 
3.5 Results: After configuring the power setting in our test 
bed, software: fedora 15, UHD-003.006, gnuradio 3.7.0, 
OpenBTS 3.1 also Hardware: USRPN210 + GPSDO from 
Ettus Research. Installed Asterisk as the soft IP phone. as 
matter of fact we dont use proprietary SIM Cards, use the 
regular SIM cards issued by a legal Telco Operator.after a 
week's struggle able to make a mobile handset connect to the 
tower. Here is the log for the same.When sender send message 
via mobile phone ,capture this with usrp2 ,and at first updated 
sender location and requested to update sender mobile phone’s 
data . At second check International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity(IMSI) which that include in withelist or not, if (IMSI) 
has’nt any problems register and allow this to send a  message 
.Third, sender can find which type of message has be send and 
when sender message delivery confirm about this matter , and 
mobility massage class send CPack as sending message is ok 
.Finally we obtained the following results after sending 
message:  
 MobilityManagement.cpp:194:LocationUpdatingControll
er: MM Location Updating Request UpdateType=(7) 
LAI=(MCC=404 MNC=07 LAC=0xfffe) 
MobileIdentity=(IMSI=404070536564665) 
classmark=(revision=1 ES-IND=1 A5/1=0 powerCap=3)  
 Jan 20 16:10:58 localhost : INFO 3062872944 16:10:58.2 
MobilityManagement.cpp:239:LocationUpdatingControll
er: not checking white-list for IMSI404070536564665  
  Jan 20 16:10:58 localhost : INFO 3062872944 
16:10:58.2 
MobilityManagement.cpp:420:LocationUpdatingControll
er: registration ALLOWED: IMSI=404070536564665   
  Jan 20 16:10:58 localhost : INFO 3062872944 
16:10:58.9 
MobilityManagement.cpp:121:sendWelcomeMessage: 
sending Control.LUR.OpenRegistration.Message message 
to handset 
  Jan 20 16:10:59 localhost : INFO 3062872944 
16:10:59.4 SMSControl.cpp:388:deliverSMSToMS: 
sending CP-DATA TI=5 
RPDU=(01f503a10000004b0403a101f100004110026101
952244d7327bfc6e9741f437888e2e838ed326885e9ed341
ee32fdfe96af5d2050f65d978392cd6912 
949e8340c9e634a9a3c168b01bac36b3d56c349bad06)  
 Jan 20 16:11:02 localhost : INFO 3062872944 16:11:02.4 
SMSControl.cpp:447:deliverSMSToMS: MTSMS: 
sending CPAck  
IV:  Conclusion 
In this paper we represented an overview of how to build 
a ghost Base Station using commercially available off the 
shelf hardware components and open source software. We 
also succeeded in demonstrating the captured SMS 
messages of friendly mobile users to understand the 
cryptographic algorithms used. We came to know that 
none of the Telco operators provides encryption at the 
network layer. Hence we recommend that alike business 
and banks design their mobile applications where in 
encryption is done at the application layer. 
While the developed cellular Base Station has practical 
limitations with respect to transmission range and region 
of coverage, both issues can be overcome by using proper 
hardware. Our system was built using a 100mwatt power 
source; therefore it provides us with a transmission range 
of 150 feet. The transmission range can be easily 
increased to a much higher level by using an external 
power amplifier. Power amplifiers of 1Kwatt are available 
and can be used in our hardware to boost transmission 
range to 1.5KM. Our prototype uses a directional antenna; 
hence cannot scan mobile phones in all directions. 
Though expensive, omni-directional antennas can be 
easily provided from market.This is just to demonstrate 
the proof of concept,extension may easily be realized. 
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